Nuclear

Biological

Delivery

• Missiles - retained stock
• Missiles - rebuilt facilities
  • al-Mamoun
  • al-Mutasim
• Missiles - al-Samoud and Ababil-100 (al-Fatah)
• Missiles - al-Rafah / Shahiyat liquid propellant engine static test stand
• Missiles - imports
• Delivery of chemical and biological weapons
  • Artillery projectiles
  • Aerial bombs
    • R-400 and R-400A bombs
    • Other major aerial bombs
  • Airborne sprayers

Evaluation. The claims about a retained stock of ballistic missiles seem unlikely. According to UNSCOM, by 1997, 817 out of Iraq's imported 819 Scud-B ballistic missiles had been certifiably destroyed. This finding was endorsed by UNSCOM commissioners in their report of November 1997 (para.7). On the worst-case assumption that Iraq has salvaged some of the parts for these missiles and has reconstructed them since 1998, even Charles Duelfer - former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, deputy head of UNSCOM and strong proponent of an invasion of Iraq - has provided an estimate of only 12 to 14 missiles held by Iraq.

There remain questions about Iraq's retained missile engines and warheads. Iraq produced 121 Scud-type warheads, and UNSCOM did not manage to find remnants of approximately 25 of them. Iraq also developed 7 engines, it claims, for training purposes, and states that these engines were destroyed in July 1991. UNSCOM was unable to verify this claim, but inspectors have yet to analyse the fragments Iraq claims were found from the destruction of these engines on 4 August 1997.

Evaluation. Iraq incorporated into its declaration of 7 December 2002 its claims about the status of these new projects. According to Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, in his notes for briefing the Security Council of 19 December 2002:

"In the missile area, there is a go[o]d deal of information regarding Iraq's activities in the past few years. As declared by Iraq, these are permitted activities, which will be monitored by UNMOVIC to ensure that they comply with the relevant Council resolutions. A series of new projects have been declared that are at various stages of development. They include a design for a new liquid oxygen/ethanol propellant engine and replacement of guidance systems for several surface-to-air missiles. These projects will need to be investigated and evaluated by UNMOVIC."

As the declaration is not in the public realm, it is impossible to assess the material that Iraq has provided. However, it seems that the claim of the State Department (19 Dec 02) and White House in response to Iraq's dossier is incorrect: Iraq has admitted that the range of both al-Samoud II and al-Fatah in test flights has exceeded the 150km limit.

al-Samoud II

"In the missile area, Iraq has declared the development of a missile known as the Al Samoud, which uses components from an imported surface-to-air missile. A variant of the Al Samoud, with a larger diameter (760 mm) than the standard version (500 mm) has been declared. [...] In the latest update of the semi-annual monitoring declarations, Iraq has declared that in 13 flight tests of the Al Samoud the missile has exceeded the permitted range. The greatest range achieved was 183 kilometres."

Hans Blix, notes for briefing the Security Council of 19 December 2002

On 27 January 2003, Blix reported:

"During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were briefed on these two programmes. We were told that the final range for both systems would be less than the permitted maximum range of 150 km. These missiles might well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems. The test ranges in excess of 150 km are significant, but some further technical considerations need to be made, before we reach a conclusion on this issue. In the mean time, we have asked Iraq to cease flight tests of both missiles."

As part of the evidence-collection, on 12 December an UNMOVIC - IAEA joint press statement recorded the following test:

"An UNMOVIC team attended a test launch of a short-range ballistic missile being developed by Iraq. The test took place at a test range approximately 200 km west of Baghdad. The missile is a modified version of a missile already owned by Iraq. The missile range falls within that allowed under the UN resolutions. The UNMOVIC team was able to examine the missile before launch to verify its configuration."

UNMOVIC have not disclosed the specific missile programme, but is presumably the Ababil-100 (otherwise known as al-Fatah) programme, as this missile (unlike al-Samoud) is a modified version of the artillery rocket with a 100km range that was designed before the 1991 war.

A further test was conducted on 9 January 2003: "An UNMOVIC missile team witnessed a static test firing of the Al Samoud missile engine late in the afternoon yesterday, 9 January, after the morning test was postponed for technical reasons." Further static tests were conducted on 12 January and 23 February 2003. No further details were disclosed in either case.

On 14 February 2003, Blix confirmed that the al-Samoud II was indeed capable of exceeding 150km, and was therefore proscribed. The Iraqi government seemed to have accepted the discontination of this programme, including the tagging of al-Samoud missiles on 16 February 2003 to allow the detection of their movement. Inspections of facilities used in the production of al-Samoud have continued, and on 18, 19 and 20 February 2003 the missiles were tagged.

On 21 February, Blix confirmed in a letter that al-Samoud II missiles and associated items were considered proscribed, and he listed a number of items, including all al-Samoud II missiles and warheads, fuel and oxidizer, 380 SA-2 missile engines, and all engine components associated with this SA-2 engine that needed to be destroyed.

On 27 February 2003, Iraq sent a letter to UNMOVIC, which stated - according to the UNMOVIC spokesman - "that they agree in principle to the UNMOVIC request to start destroying the Al Samoud 2 missiles and other associated items by the first of March." Technical discussions were held on 28 February to ensure that UN inspectors could guide and supervise the destruction of the missiles, their components and associated systems.

The process of destruction began on 1 March 2003, with four al-Samoud II missiles and a casting chamber destroyed on that day. Warheads and the second casting chamber were destroyed on 3 March. On 4 March, UNMOVIC reported that "Now the two casting chambers are considered totally destroyed." A missile launcher and engines were also destroyed on 4 March. By 17 March, 72 missiles out of a total of about 120 had been destroyed, together with 47 warheads, as well as two casting chambers, two launchers, 5 engines, tools and special equipment to produce the al-Samoud II engine, computer software to launch the missile, small components, and several propellant tanks.

The progress in the destruction of al-Samoud II missiles was noted by Hans Blix in his 7 March 2003 statement to the Security Council:

"The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament - indeed, the first since the middle of the 1990s. [...] Until today, 34 Al Samoud 2 missiles, including 4 training missiles, 2 combat warheads, 1 launcher and 5 engines have been destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. Work is continuing to identify and inventory the parts and equipment associated with the Al Samoud 2 programme. Two 'reconstituted' casting chambers used in the production of solid propellant missiles have been destroyed and the remnants melted or encased in concrete."

Ababil-100 (now known as al-Fatah)

This rocket has also come under UNMOVIC scrutiny as a result of Iraq's admission that it exceeds the 150km range. Iraq declared on 7 December that in 33 tests of its unguided version, 8 of them had flown between 150km and 161km. On 6 March 2003, UNMOVIC reported that the final assessment of its status had not yet been made, as more evidence needed to be collected ("Unresolved Disarmament Issues", pp.15, 38).

Evaluation. This site has been repeatedly inspected, beginning on 27 November 2002. Recent inspections include those of 4 February 2003.

The relevant excerpt of the UNMOVIC / IAEA report of 21 January 2003 read:

"Another missile team traveled to the Shahiyat Test Facility, about 100 km north of Baghdad, to verify that this site was still abandoned."

Dr Blix made this point explicit in his briefing to the Security Council on 14 February 2003:

"The experts also studied the data on the missile engine test stand that is nearing completion [...]. So far, the test stand has not been associated with a proscribed activity."

The Iraqi government does seem to have admitted that they managed to import missile parts in violation of the sanctions regime. The SA-2 missile engines are stored at Ibn Al Haytham. According to Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, in his notes for briefing the Security Council of 9 January 2003,

"Iraq, in the [7 December 2002] Declaration, has declared the import of missile engines and raw material for the production of solid missile fuel. This import has taken place in violation of the relevant resolutions regulating import and export to Iraq. Inspections have confirmed the presence of a relatively large number of missile engines, some imported as late as 2002. We have yet to determine the significance of these illegal imports relating to the specific WMD-mandate of UNMOVIC."

On 16 February 2003, UNMOVIC inspectors tagged the SA-2 missile engines, so that any illicit use could be detected. The process of destruction of these engines began in early March 2003, as recounted above (in the discussion of al-Samoud II missiles). By 9 March 2003, 5 engines had been destroyed.

Evaluation: Artillery shells and Iraq's munitions have a very limited range, and could only be considered a threat to Iraq's own citizenry and those within a few kilometres of Iraq's borders. However, inspections have demonstrated that Iraq has retained at least a small number of chemical warheads. Artillery projectiles are not suitable for use with biological agents.

Artillery projectiles. Iraq declared that it had imported 85,000 empty 155mm projectiles before August 1990. 70,000 were filled with chemical agents (mostly mustard), and of these Iraq declared that 54,000 were used between 1984 and 1988. Out of the remainder, UNSCOM destroyed 12,792 mustard 155mm projectiles in the period 1992-94, as it stated in its report of January 1999 (Appendix II, para.11). Iraq stated that it converted the unfilled projectiles to conventional munitions in the period from 1992-93. This claim seems to have been endorsed by UNSCOM, as UNMOVIC reported in "Unresolved Disarmament Issues" (6 March 2003), p.54:

"Iraq declared that it had unilaterally converted approximately 15,500 empty 155-mm artillery projectiles, purchased for chemical warfare use, into conventional high explosive munitions in 1992-93. UNSCOM attempted to verify the disposition of these munitions and found approximately 1,800 of these projectiles at the Babylon Ammunition Depot. UNSCOM was satisfied with its findings and did not pursue the matter further."

The 122mm chemical warheads were a major element in Iraq's programme prior to 1991. Iraq declared that it produced or purchased over 100,000 such warheads. Many of these were used in the Iran-Iraq war, and 14,000 warheads were handed over the UNSCOM for destruction (as stated in UNSCOM's report of January 1999, Appendix II, para.11). Iraq claimed that the remaining 26,000 warheads were destroyed either unilaterally or in bombing during the Gulf War. The extent of destruction of 122mm rocket warheads was confirmed by UNSCOM:

"In 1991, two locations were seen by UNSCOM where rockets had been destroyed. Evidence of many destroyed rockets was found [..]. In the period 1991-1998, remnants of about 4,000 rockets were recovered and accounted for by UNSCOM. [...] Completely destroyed hangers where rockets had been destroyed were seen by UNSCOM. Evidence of many destroyed rockets was found. Accounting for the remnants was not possible due to the extent of the destruction. [..] In 1995, documentary evidence was provided by Iraq that 36,500 rockets had been stored at a facility destroyed during the Gulf war. [..] Remnants of 11,500 rockets destroyed through demolition were seen by UNSCOM. Accounting was not possible due to the state of destruction. [..] UNSCOM was presented with ingots declared to be from the melting of 15,000 rockets. The material presented could not be assessed as adequate for proper verification."

UNSCOM's report of January 1999, Appendix II, para.11

In all of these cases, UNSCOM - despite being able to verify the large-scale destruction of rocket warheads - was not able to quantify that destruction. As such, attempts to put a number to the number of rocket warheads that Iraq may still possess are problematic.

On 16 January 2003, an UNMOVIC multidisciplinary team visited the Ukhaider Ammunition Storage Area (170km southwest of Baghdad), and found "11 empty 122 mm chemical warheads and one warhead that requires further evaluation. The warheads were in excellent condition and were similar to ones imported by Iraq during the late 1980’s." Further samples were taken from the 12th warhead on 18 and 28 January 2003. Both this warhead and the storage building are under IAEA seal.

Iraq also declared 4 more items at al-Taji munitions stores on 20 January 2003, and these were inspected on 21 January 2003. UNMOVIC discovered another single empty warhead on 4 February 2003, and "an empty 122 mm Al Burak chemical warhead and an empty plastic chemical agent canister" on 9 February 2003, at al-Taji Ammunition Depot. The warheads were tagged and secured, and samples have been taken for analysis. Reports say that the range of the rockets for these warheads is 6 miles, and that they are all Sakr-18 warheads.

In subsequent interviews, the UNMOVIC Executive Chairman provided more details on the find:

"These things were laying in boxes. They had never been opened. They were covered by bird droppings, so they'd been there for some time. But they had never been opened, actually, and they were in excellent conditions. They were from pre-1990, so at the time when they were able to have these things legally. But of course, they should have been properly declared and, in fact, destroyed."

CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, 19 January 2003.

He also seems to have warned against attributing too much significance to this find:

"He warned against over-dramatising the discovery last Thursday of 12 warheads, saying none had produced 'any evidence' of containing traces of lethal chemicals. 'We haven't found a gun but a little bit of smoke... we must not forget that these were empty things and in all likelihood they never had anything in them.'"

"'I will not be pushed into war by US' - Blix", The Observer (London), 19 January 2003.

Hans Blix also corrected his earlier assessment that the warheads had been found in a new storage area:

"You recall that when we were here last time there had been a finding of 12 empty chemical warheads of 122 mm [...]. I should comment in the margin that when we made a statement about this we did say that we believed they were stored in new bunkers and therefore we must conclude that they were moved there after 1991. After further study we should correct that statement that where they were stored was not new. I'd like to stand corrected on behalf of my Commission in that regard."

Press Conference, 9 February 2003

The site at which the warheads were found, the Ukhaider Ammunition Storage Area, is a well-known storage site for Iraq's permitted artillery, and is frequently searched by inspectors. According to Raymond Zilinskas, a former UNSCOM biological weapons inspector and consultant to the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense (and director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program, Monterey Institute of International Studies):

"If there are depots with millions of rounds of artillery shells for conventional use and one box of artillery shells for chemical use, it would be easy to miss. It could have fallen between the cracks".

Los Angeles Times, 17 January 2003, reprinted here.

Furthermore, it appears that the 12 rockets found at Ukhaider were not part of a significantly larger stock that could still be uncovered:

"A Commission of Inquiry has been set up by Iraq to investigate why these warheads were stored at these sites or whether any more such warheads or other proscribed munitions are stored at other locations in Iraq. According to a document from the Commission, which was handed over to UNMOVIC in February 2003, the 12 warheads were part of a batch of less than 20 warheads received by Al Muthana in 1989 for training and reverse engineering purposes."

UNMOVIC, "Unresolved Disarmament Issues" (6 March 2003), p.54.

The same report records that the "Sealed casings containing some of the rocket warheads were dated April 1988", and that the liquid found in one of the warheads "was found to be water contaminated by hydrogen sulphide, which seems to be consistent with the fact that coloured water was used for trial purposes to simulate a CW agent." (p.55).

Aerial bombs. Iraq claims to have destroyed its aerial bombs in the summer of 1991. UNSCOM was not able to account for 300 to 350 R-400 and R-400A bombs (R-400A bombs are R-400 bombs that have had an internal epoxy coating to carry biological agents). It is these bombs that are referred to by the State Department on 19 December 2002 as "400 biological weapon-capable aerial bombs", though the numbers appear to have been exaggerated. It should be noted that the reason that UNSCOM was not able to account for some of the bombs was as follows:

"UNSCOM found that the accounting for some of the unilaterally destroyed bombs was not possible given the hazardous conditions created by the method of destruction."

UNMOVIC, "Unresolved Disarmament Issues" (6 March 2003), p.46.

On 19 February 2003, Iraq began to excavate Al Aziziya Range (100km southwest of Baghdad), the site of the purported destruction of bombs that had been filled with biological agents, claiming that the material was no longer so dangerous. It was visited by UNMOVIC's biological team from 25 February. In the news update of 26 February, UNMOVIC gave the following description:

"An UNMOVIC biological team returned to the Al Aziziyah Range, where excavations of the R400 aerial bombs were under way. Iraq claims that these bombs filled with biological agents had been unilaterally destroyed in 1991. The team observed the excavation of a pit and inspected excavated munitions and fragments. UNMOVIC also conducted an aerial survey of the site."

On both 27 and 28 February, "Additional fragments of R-400 bombs were identified" (similarly, on 2 and 3 March). The contents of these bomb fragments were subject to analysis from 2 March 2003. A full account was provided by Hans Blix in his 7 March 2003 statement to the Security Council:

"To date, Iraq has unearthed eight complete bombs comprising two liquid-filled intact R-400 bombs and six other complete bombs. Bomb fragments were also found. Samples have been taken. The investigation of the destruction site could, in the best case, allow the determination of the number of bombs destroyed at that site. It should be followed by a serious and credible effort to determine the separate issue of how many R-400 type bombs were produced. In this, as in other matters, inspection work is moving on and may yield results."

Other aerial bombs. Between 1983 and 1990, UNSCOM estimated that Iraq produced or procured some 30,000 aerial bombs, used to disseminate chemical or biological agents. UNSCOM supervised the destruction of 12,000 of these bombs, as well as the aerial bomb production plant.

There are two residual areas of uncertainty. Firstly, it is unclear how many of these aerial bombs were used in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). The above discussion on the Air Force document indicates that the staus of over 6500 aerial bombs remains unresolved. Secondly, UNSCOM was not able to confirm that 2000 bombs were destroyed in a fire accident, as Iraq has claimed.

Evaluation. The two items of concern are remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), which are controlled from an external guidance system, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which fly autonomously to pre-programmed targets. UNMOVIC has claimed that UAVs and RPVs with a range greater than 150km are proscribed (in its 6 March 2003 working document, pp.14-15). The basis for this claim is unexplained: only ballistic missiles with a range of greater than 150km are prohibited under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), para.8(b); and all UAVs are listed as items that must be declared (not destroyed) in Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002), para.3. There do not appear to be any resolutions or statements of the Security Council which indicate that a specific range of UAVs are prohibited.

The claims about Iraq's UAVs originate from an occasion in 1998 when small Czech-built L-29 training jets were spotted at Iraq's Talil airbase in 1998. A British defence official invoked the possibility that if these drones were flown at low altitudes under the right conditions, a single drone could unleash a toxic cloud engulfing several city blocks. He labelled them "drones of death". The hyperbole is misleading: even if Iraq has designed such planes, they would not serve their purpose, as drones are easy to shoot down (as the US has itself found: see the Chicago Tribune, 2 March 2003). A simple air defence system would be enough to prevent the drones from causing damage to neighbouring countries. The L-29 has a total range of less than 400 miles: it would be all but impossible to use it in an attack on Israel. The only possibility for their use against western targets would be their potential deployment against invading troops.

The CIA report of October 2002 and Secretary Powell's statement of 5 February 2003, quoted above, invoke the possibility that these drones could cause widespread suffering in the US if they were transported to the US. How Iraq could possibly transport planes fitted with a mechanism for dispensing chemical or biological agents into the US is left unexplained, and the explanation provided by the State Department on 27 February 2003 - delivery by ship - lacks credibility, given the extensive monitoring of ships leaving from Iraq's port.

Iraq has admitted engaging in various UAV and RPV projects since the 1980s, including:

• the modification of Mirage F-1 drop-tanks for the dispersion of biological warfare agents in 1990-91, producing three modified drop-tanks as well as one prototype drop-tank. Iraq claims that the drop tanks were destroyed in mid-1991. UNSCOM verified the remains of the three modified tanks, but did not find the dissemination devices. One of these was presented to UNSCOM in April 1998. UNSCOM was not able to find evidence for the destruction of the modified drop-tank.
• the modification of the Mirage F-1 drop-tanks for use on a MiG-21 fighter aircraft, which would be remotely piloted. Iraq claims that this programme was terminated in April 1991.
• the development of aerosol generators for use on a modified crop dusting helicopter, from July 1987-Sept 1988. Iraq handed over to UNSCOM various items related to this project in March 1996.
• the conversion of the L-29 aircraft into a RPV as part of al-Baia'a project, declared by Iraq in July 1998 as used for air defence training. The range of craft was designed as 30km. The project began in November 1995. In its 7 December 2002 declaration, Iraq claimed that this project was discontinued due to lack of parts in 2000.

In its 7 December 2002 declaration, Iraq did not mention the development of any new UAVs, but referred to the development of two RPVs (Musaryara 20 and Musaryara 30) with a range of 100km, as well as continuing work on smaller RPVs with a range less than 30km. UNMOVIC (in its 6 March 2003 working document, p.59) has also stated that there may be signs that Iraq has developed a chemical weapons drop-tank that it has not declared, and that the rationale presented for why Iraq did not convert more drop-tanks into use for biological agents - the shortage of suitable valves - is unconvincing.

Iraq's facilities in producing RPVs and UAVs have been repeatedly inspected. Most recently, UNMOVIC biological teams have on 4 March inspected the Ibn Fernas Centre in northern Baghdad; and on 5 March inspected the Samarra East Airfield (about 90km north of Baghdad), used for the flight-testing of RPVs. On 6 March 2003, UNMOVIC reported that another drone, with a wingspan of 7.45m, was also under development; this item was under investigation to determine if its range exceeded 150km ("Unresolved Disarmament Issues", p.14).

Key post-war readings:

• Dafna Linzer and John J. Lumpkin, "Experts Doubt U.S. Claim on Iraqi Drones", Associated Press, 24 August 2003.
  
• Bradley Graham, "Air Force Analysts Feel Vindicated on Iraqi Drones", Washington Post, 26 September 2003.