GI SPECIAL 4L16:

[Thanks to Katherine GY, Military Project, who sent this in.]

“Iraq Is Not Undergoing A Civil War”

“80% Of Attacks Are Against The Occupation Forces, Not Civilian Targets”
“The Country Is In The Throes Of An Anti-Occupation Struggle”

December 8, 2006 by Sarah Shields, CommonDreams. Sarah Shields teaches the history of the Middle East at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

Calling the tragedy in Iraq a "civil war" is not only inaccurate. It is morally indefensible, laying the blame for the horrific violence and the destruction of a country and a society upon the victims of an illegal, aggressive war.

It allows pundits like Thomas Friedman to claim that the country has been dysfunctional for a millenium, ignoring a long historical context of international support for Iraq's brutal dictator, debilitating and murderous sanctions by the United Nations, and a catastrophic and unprovoked US-led invasion of a sovereign state.

More important, if Americans believe that Iraq is in "civil war," liberals would argue that the United States must remain in order to prevent an even worse outbreak of violence.

| Iraq is not undergoing a civil war. |
| The country is in the throes of an anti-occupation struggle. |
| Having declared, with the installation of the current government, that Iraq is no longer occupied, the US government and media can hardly frame the current violence as a struggle against a continuing occupation. |

Nonetheless, what is being cast as civil war is the latest example in a long line of peoples’ fighting against occupation, struggles in which those groups who collaborate with an occupier are themselves targeted by those seeking to end an occupation.

Algerians fighting the French also attacked those indigenous forces who had allied themselves with France.

Moroccans targeted the goumiers, local troops who worked with the French in suppressing a rebellion against foreign control.

The Vietcong fought not only Americans, but also the Vietnamese who collaborated with the occupation.

Zulu Inkatha were targeted for working on behalf of South Africa’s white government. Irish nationalists linked Protestants with the British occupiers.
The occupiers tried to present each as an example of the intrinsic and intractable violence of these societies, which provided yet another example of their continuing need for the benevolent protection of the occupation.

Framing the Iraq tragedy as civil war forces the US media to ignore the clear inconsistencies.

Shi’ite forces under Muqtada al-Sadr attack the forces of a Shi’ite-led government. News reports day after day describe terrible attacks against civilian populations, with no coverage at all of violence against American forces.

Where are our mounting casualties coming from?

The BBC writes that eighty percent of attacks are against the occupation forces, not against civilian targets.

Iraqi targets are often people either directly collaborating or trying to collaborate with the occupation (local police and military recruits), and people whose continuing work allows the current government to function.

The apparent contradiction in which Iraqis would attack those who allow the hospitals, schools, and services to continue is comprehensible only in the context of an anti-occupation struggle where an insurgency tries to prevent the functioning of a government installed by an occupation army.

The United States exacerbated ethnic conflict in Iraq in order to refocus a growing anti-occupation insurgency, beginning with our arming Shi’ites to help us attack Sunni forces in Fallujah. Even then, some Shi’ites came to the aid of the Sunnis in a clear rejection of US efforts to divide the country.

The militias introduced into the Iraqi Interior Ministry during the era of John Negroponte (accused of eliciting the same behavior in 1980s Honduras) have unquestionably engaged in sectarian killings. It is impossible to argue that sectarian violence has no history in Iraq; nonetheless, despite Saddam Hussein’s efforts to expel some Shi’ites during the 1980s, Sunnis and Shi’is continued to marry each other, to be members of the same tribes, and to live in the same neighborhoods.

Sectarian violence has increased dramatically during the United States occupation of Iraq. The occupation has only exacerbated the violence.

The reasons are consistent with countless historical examples.

Occupiers try to divide the country in order to keep their opposition weak.

And those who would resist occupation invariably attack those who would collaborate with the occupation.

Iraqis will only become more and more divided the longer the United States remains in their country. The notion that we could stabilize Iraq and leave a viable government is absurd when looked at historically.
Governments in power during occupation, collaborators with occupation forces, are most often overthrown when the occupiers leave.

Whenever US forces leave, Iraqis will have to struggle to create their own state. The sooner we leave, the fewer people will have been compromised by their connection with our occupation.

Had we ended our occupation at the end of 2003 before the siege of Fallujah, or had we left Iraq in February 2006 before the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, Iraqis could have begun to reconstruct their own government and infrastructure without the horrific inter-communal violence that is now escalating daily.

Our occupation has hardly prevented chaos and civil war, and leaving today would not miraculously end the violence that has been building over the past three years.

But our immediate departure would allow Iraqis to get on with reconstruction without the polarizing presence of a continuing occupation.

If we insist on staying, we will preside over the remainder of the annihilation of the state we have worked, for decades, to destroy.

MORE:

**Attacks On Occupation Forces Up Sharply To 959 A Week**

Dec 18 AP

According to the Pentagon report sent to Congress on Monday, attacks on U.S. and Iraqi troops jumped sharply in recent months to the highest level since June 2004.

From mid-August to mid-November, the weekly average number of attacks increased 22 percent from the previous three months. The worst violence was in Baghdad and in the western province of Anbar, long the focus of activity by Sunni insurgents, the report said.

A bar chart in the Pentagon’s report to Congress gave no exact numbers but indicated the weekly average had approached 1,000 in the latest period, compared with about 800 per week from the May-to-August period.

Statistics provided separately by the Pentagon said weekly attacks had averaged 959 in the latest period.

**IRAQ WAR REPORTS**
One Marine Dies In Al Anbar

Dec. 18, 2006 Public Affairs Office, Camp Victory RELEASE No. 20061218-06

CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq: One Marine assigned to Regimental Combat Team 5 died Dec. 16 from wounds sustained due to enemy action while operating in Al Anbar Province.

Route Clearing Mission Ends in Vehicle Rollover Killing One Baghdad Soldier, Another Injured

Dec. 18, 2006 Public Affairs Office, Camp Victory RELEASE No. 20061218-37

BAGHDAD: One Multi-National Division Baghdad Soldier was killed and another injured when a Bradley Fighting Vehicle rolled over during a route clearance mission north of the Iraqi capital Dec. 18.

Soldier Killed In Al Anbar

Dec. 18, 2006 Public Affairs Office, Camp Victory RELEASE No. 20061218-24a

CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq: One Soldier assigned to 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division died Dec. 15 from wounds sustained due to enemy action while operating in Al Anbar Province.

Marine From Kingwood Killed In Iraq

04:16 PM CST on Friday, December 15, 2006

Lance Corporal Luke Yepsen, 20, was killed Thursday.
By Juanita Jimenez-Soto / 11 News

A Marine from Kingwood who recently arrived in the Middle East is being remembered.

Lance Corporal Luke Yepsen was conducting combat operations in the Al Anbar Province of Iraq when he was killed Thursday.

Yepsen was a Marine Corps infantryman.

Yepsen’s family said they are devastated by this loss.

Yepsen, 20, was from Kingwood. He left Texas A&M his freshman year to join the military. His family said he was a military man with a strong desire to serve his country.

He was a blackbelt in Tae Kwan Do, but his family said he had a bigger heart.

Yepsen leaves behind a large extended family and a young woman, Sandra Brumen, who was his fiancé.

A candle prayer service will be held for Lance Corporal Luke Yepsen at 7:30 p.m. Friday in the Pavilion of St. Martha’s Catholic Church and School on Woodland Hills Drive in Kingwood.

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Colorado Marine Killed By Iraq Sniper

12/18/06 myfoxcolorado

A Marine from Leadville was killed by sniper fire in Iraq this weekend.

Rachele and Brad Palmer say their son Nick Palmer, 19, was killed Saturday while in a Humvee.

His family says Palmer joined the Marines after graduating from Lake County High School. He was part of the 2nd Battalion, 8th marines from Camp Pendleton, CA. He was stationed in Fallujah.

His parents say two marines came to their Leadville home Saturday to inform them of his death.
Remembering a fallen hero from Perry County- 29-year-old Brent Dunkleberger, a soldier with the U.S. Army died in the line of duty Tuesday.

Brent Dunkleberger has a large family. All are pulling together at this time of grief. They are not focusing on the negative though. They are grieving by telling stories about Brent. And they shared some of those stories with CBS 21 News.

"We were playing in the snow. He was just so funny. He was just hilarious," said Jenise Wilfong, Brent's cousin. Through storytelling, Jenise Wilfong and Marcie Emlet, get through the pain of losing a cousin and a brother.

Brent Dunkleberger of New Bloomfield, died Tuesday after a rocket-propelled grenade struck his vehicle. He was part of a convoy security mission in the Iraqi city of Mosul. This was his second tour.

"I remember right before he went for his first tour, he was like excited to do his job. I would have been scared, but he wasn't," said Jenise Wilfong, Brent's cousin.

"He wasn't looking forward to going back, but if he were to do it again, he would still do it," said Marcie Emlet, Brent's sister.

Brent graduated from West Perry High School in 1996. And after high school, he took some classes at a local technical school. His sister Marcie says, he was also a junior fire fighter with the New Bloomfield Fire Department. Then after he got married, it was time to join the Army.

"Nothing about 9-11 had quite come about yet. It was shortly after that, that did happen and then it was like, 'Oh no,' it was scary then with him being in," said Marcie.
Brent leaves behind a wife and four children, all between the ages of 3-and-11. They are the ones who will miss him most of all.

The Dunkleberger family is collecting donations to help with funeral and other costs. If you would like to help, make a check out the Dunkleberger family and drop it off or mail it to the Mifflintown Bank at 219 South Carlisle Street, New Bloomfield, 17068.

La Crescenta Soldier Is 300th Californian To Die In Iraq

December 18, 2006 NBC4.tv.

LA CRESCENTA, Calif. -- A soldier from La Crescenta has become the 300th Californian killed in Iraq.

Army Specialist Nicholas P. Steinbacher, 22, died Saturday of injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device was detonated near his armored vehicle in Baghdad on Dec. 10.

More military personnel from California have died in Iraq than from any other state. At least 2,946 American service men and women have died in Iraq since the war began in 2003.

Wolfeboro, NH Soldier Reported Killed In Iraq

12/17/2006 Matt Bush, WCSH6

The war in Iraq is hitting home again in New Hampshire. The family of 22-year-old Matthew Stanley from Wolfeboro got word Sunday morning that he had been killed in Iraq.

There are few details, but police in Wolfeboro said the Army notified the family this morning that Stanley had been killed by a roadside bomb.

In Iraq, the military was not releasing names, but said a roadside bomb killed three American soldiers and injured a fourth north of Baghdad Saturday. The soldiers were clearing a route so another unit could move through the area.

OCCUPATION ISN’T LIBERATION
BRING ALL THE TROOPS HOME NOW!
THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO COMPREHENSIBLE REASON TO BE IN THIS EXTREMELY HIGH RISK LOCATION AT THIS TIME, EXCEPT THAT A CROOKED POLITICIAN WHO LIVES IN THE WHITE HOUSE WANTS YOU THERE, SO HE WILL LOOK GOOD

That is not a good enough reason.

10.27.06: US soldiers man a checkpoint beside a Stryker armored personnel carrier in central Baghdad. (AFP/Ali Al-Saadi)

AFGHANISTAN WAR REPORTS

Three U.S. Soldiers Wounded In Kandahar

Dec 18 KHOST, Afghanistan (AFP)
Four Taliban insurgents were killed in a clash late Sunday in the southern province of Kandahar which also left three US-led coalition soldiers injured, the US military said in a statement.

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**Eastford Soldier Killed In Afghanistan**

A 38-year-old Eastford soldier was killed in Afghanistan Friday by a roadside explosion, his wife said.

Military officials notified Michelle Phaneuf of Eastford Saturday her husband, Connecticut Army National Guard Staff Sgt. Joseph Phaneuf II died Friday when a vehicle he was riding in struck a roadside bomb.

According to his wife, Phaneuf was a member of the First Battalion 102nd Infantry. He had served in the military in the 1990s and re-enlisted after the 2001 terrorist attacks.

Funeral and burial arrangements have not been made, but Michelle Phaneuf said her husband wanted to be buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

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**Car Bomb Wounds Two Occupation Troops; Nationality Not Announced**

12.18.06 AP
KABUL, Afghanistan - A bomber rammed his vehicle into a coalition convoy Monday, wounding two troops of the U.S.-led coalition, the military said.

The attack, in which two vehicles also were damaged, occurred east of the city of Kandahar, the statement said.

The military did not disclose for nationalities of the wounded soldiers, but most of the troops serving with the coalition are American.

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**Assorted Resistance Action**

Dec 18 KHOST, Afghanistan (AFP) & The Associated Press

A major firefight broke out early Monday after nearly 200 militants crossed the border from Pakistan and attacked a border checkpoint in the eastern Afghan province of Khost, police said.

Five Taliban fighters and an Afghan militia soldier died in the hour-long exchange of fire, provincial police official Gul Dad said, adding that four Afghan nationals were arrested.

On Sunday, coalition troops used airstrikes during clashes with suspected militants in Kandahar's Sperwan Ghar district, killing four insurgents and wounding three soldiers, the military said.

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**TROOP NEWS**

*Broke Down Army:*

"Gen. Abizaid Told Lawmakers That The U.S. Couldn't Maintain Even A Relatively Small Increase Of 20,000 Soldiers In Iraq For More Than A Few Months"

"‘We’re Struggling In A Sea Of Meaningless Slaughter -- Along With
Everyone Else With A Job To Do Here,’ Says Sgt. Mastin Greene”
“There Is Great Frustration Not Just With The Defense Secretary But Also With The Generals Who Serve Above Them”

[Thanks to Joel Geier, who suggested this article.]

Many soldiers only recently received their new M-4 rifles and rifle sights, which are in short supply because of an Army-wide cash crunch. Some still lack their machine guns or long-range surveillance systems, which are used to spot insurgents laying down roadside bombs. They've been told they'll pick up most of that when they get to Iraq.

First Sgt. Bradley Feltman, who will leave in January for his second year-long tour in three years, says his troop was short of Humvees to train on and had only 25% of the mounts it needed for its machine guns. The lack of equipment hindered the unit's ability to train as an entire 130-man unit. Instead, they trained one 30-soldier platoon at a time.

December 11, 2006 By GREG JAFFE, Wall St. Journal [Excerpts]

FORT STEWART, Ga. -- With just six weeks before they leave for Iraq, the 3,500 soldiers from the Third Infantry Division's First Brigade should be learning about Ramadi, the insurgent stronghold where they will spend a year.

Many of the troops don't even know the basic ethnic makeup of the largely Sunni city.

"We haven't spent as much time as I would like on learning the local culture, language, and politics -- all the stuff that takes a while to really get good at," says Lt. Col. Clifford Wheeler, who commands one of the brigade's 800-soldier units.

Instead, the troops are learning to use equipment that commanders say they should ideally have been training with since the spring.

Many soldiers only recently received their new M-4 rifles and rifle sights, which are in short supply because of an Army-wide cash crunch.

Some still lack their machine guns or long-range surveillance systems, which are used to spot insurgents laying down roadside bombs. They've been told they'll pick up most of that when they get to Iraq.

The strains here at Fort Stewart -- one of the busiest posts in the U.S. military -- are apparent throughout the Army.
They spotlight a historic predicament: The Iraq war has exposed more than a
decade's worth of mistakes and miscalculations that are now seriously
undermining the world's mightiest military force.

In the 15 years after the Cold War, senior military planners and civilian-defense officials
didn't build a force geared to fighting long, grinding guerrilla wars, like Iraq and
Afghanistan. Instead they banked on fighting quick wars, dominated by high-tech
weapons systems.

The result: At a time when the war in Iraq is deepening, and debate over pulling out the
troops is intensifying, the rising cost of waging the fight is outpacing even the Army's
huge budget.

The financial squeeze is leaving the Army short of equipment and key personnel.

From 1990 to 2005, the military lavished money on billion-dollar destroyers, fighter jets
and missile-defense systems.

High-tech weaponry contributed to the swift toppling of the regimes in Iraq and
Afghanistan, but has been of little help in the more difficult task of stabilizing the two
countries.

Overly optimistic predictions by the Bush administration -- and the Army -- have
made the Army's budget crunch worse.

Both assumed troop numbers in Iraq would drop significantly by 2006 and the
Army wouldn't need as much money as it initially requested. Instead, costs have
soared, forcing front-line commanders and Pentagon generals to try to meet an
ever-growing list of demands with insufficient resources.

"Our ground forces have been stretched nearly to the breaking point," warned the
bipartisan Iraq Study Group in its recent report. "The defense budget as a whole
is in danger of disarray."

It may seem hard to believe that a country which allocated $168 billion to the Army this
year -- more than twice the 2000 budget -- can't cover the costs of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.

But the two pillars of the Army, personnel and equipment -- both built to wage
high-tech, firepower-intensive wars -- are under enormous stress:

The cost of basic equipment that soldiers carry into battle -- helmets, rifles, body
armor -- has more than tripled to $25,000 from $7,000 in 1999.

The cost of a Humvee, with all the added armor, guns, electronic jammers and
satellite-navigational systems, has grown seven-fold to about $225,000 a vehicle
from $32,000 in 2001.
The cost of paying and training troops has grown 60% to about $120,000 per soldier, up from $75,000 in 2001. On the reserve side, such costs have doubled since 2001, to about $34,000 per soldier.

At Fort Knox, Ky., the cash crunch got so bad this summer that the Army ran out of money to pay janitors who clean the classrooms where captains are taught to be commanders. So the officers, who will soon be leading 100-soldier units, clean the office toilets themselves.

"The cost of the Army is being driven up by (Iraq and Afghanistan). That's the fundamental story here," says Brig. Gen. Andrew Twomey, a senior official on the Army staff in the Pentagon. The increased costs are "not from some wild weapons system that is off in the future. These are costs associated with current demands."

Army officials say they are doing their best to ensure that Iraq and Afghanistan-bound brigades have all the equipment they need when they arrive in the war zone. But to do this, they have had to take equipment from units training back home, which are now short of even the most basic gear, such as body armor and rifles.

The equipment shortages explain why Gen. John Abizaid, the top commander in the Middle East, recently told lawmakers that the U.S. couldn't maintain even a relatively small increase of 20,000 soldiers in Iraq for more than a few months.

"The ability to sustain that commitment is simply not something that we have right now," he testified in November.

The other big strain on the Army is a shortage of people.

The Army has made much of the fact that it met its recruiting goals for 2006, bringing in 80,000 soldiers. But meeting those goals has come at a heavy cost. The Army spent about $735 million on retention bonuses in 2006 to keep battle-weary troops in the service, up from about $85 million in 2003. And it had to pay about $300 million more on recruiting this year compared to the year before.

The extra cash didn't stop the Army from having to lower standards. Although the quality of the force is still considered good, 8,500 recruits in 2006 required "moral waivers" for criminal misconduct or past drug use -- more than triple the 2,260 waivers the Army issued 10 years ago. The Army also took in more troops who scored in the bottom third on its aptitude test.

As it has brought in more borderline recruits, the Army has found itself short of officers and sergeants.

Today, it is down about 3,000 active-duty officers, a deficiency that it says will grow to about 3,700 in 2008. It is short more than 7,500 reserve and National Guard officers, according to internal Army documents.
One of the most pressing personnel problems is the lack of sergeants, the enlisted leaders who do most of the day-to-day supervising of the rank-and-file soldiers.

At Fort Hood, Texas, the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, which returned from Iraq in March, has about 75% of the soldiers it needs to fill its ranks, but only about half of its sergeants. The 5,000-soldier unit likely will go back to Iraq in the fall of next year, and leaders in the regiment say they will get more sergeants before they deploy, but not as many as they would like.

"The sergeant is the one that the soldiers take after," says First Sgt. James Adcock, who oversees about 130 of the unit's soldiers. "He can make or break how effective the privates are."

The large number of young soldiers in the unit combined with the shortage of sergeants has led to problems, say the regiment's leaders. Some also blame the Army's decision to scale back recruiting standards and push more troops through basic training. In May 2005, about 18% of Army's recruits were asked to leave before completing initial training. Today, only about 6% of recruits fail to make it through.

The troops who a year ago might have flunked out of basic training seem to stick with their units, according to Army statistics.

But some sergeants say they also seem to cause more problems.

Sgt. First Class Rajesh Harripersad, who oversees a 30-soldier platoon, says two of his soldiers were caught using marijuana and methamphetamines. Other leaders have seen an increase in accidents on and off the base.

"Discipline has been worse for me this time," says Sgt. Harripersad.

Once units deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army-wide shortage of officers and sergeants is felt even more acutely.

Teams focused on key jobs, such as reconstruction and Iraq governance, are "woefully undermanned," Col. Bill Hix, a senior Pentagon strategist, recently wrote in the Hoover Digest, a Stanford University policy journal.

Multiple internal Army studies have concluded that the military advisory teams, charged with developing Iraqi Army forces so U.S. troops can go home, need to be doubled or tripled in size.

Often, the soldiers who serve on these undermanned teams finish their year-long deployments wondering what they have accomplished.

"I would say we're an effective force for good, but we're struggling in a sea of meaningless slaughter -- along with everyone else with a job to do here," says Sgt. Mastin Greene, who serves on a reconstruction team in Baghdad.

Some of the Army's problems are a product of its failure to prepare for a guerrilla fight in which there are no front lines. Just prior to the Iraq war, the Army was buying body
armor at such a slow rate that it would have taken 48 years to outfit the entire force. It invested huge sums in the years leading up to Iraq in Humvees with canvas doors that are useless for war today.

"The fact that we had certain grim realities that were inescapable for anyone who wore a uniform in a combat zone just wasn't something that was driving our weapons programming," says Maj. Gen. Stephen Speakes, who oversees equipping Army units. Army officials now say that they entered the war short of about $56 billion of essential equipment.

The Humvee stands as a metaphor for the problems the Army faces. First fielded in the early 1980s, it was designed to ferry soldiers around behind the front lines of a conventional war. In recent years, the vehicle, which troops drive on the streets of Iraq, has been modified countless times. The Army has bolted layers of armor onto it to protect troops from roadside bombs. It has added sophisticated electronic jammers, rotating turrets, bigger machine guns, satellite navigational systems and better radios.

The result is a Humvee that is much better than the version the Army took to Iraq in 2003. But the add-ons have driven up its cost. The modified vehicle is top heavy and tends to tip over at high speeds. Army officials say they can't add more weight without overwhelming the engine or breaking the axle.

"The Army recognizes that the Humvee has reached a limit of our ability to improve it for the current fight," Gen. Speakes says.

What the Army says it really needs is an all-new vehicle, designed to better withstand roadside bombs that have become part of life in Iraq. But such a vehicle likely won't be ready until 2010 or 2012, Army officials say.

In the interim, the Army wants to buy something on the commercial market -- South Africa, Turkey and Australia all make alternatives.

Yet it's not clear whether the Army, which is struggling to equip the current force, has the money.

In the Pentagon, Army generals cut $3 billion in 2005 and 2006 from programs for weapons that are in heavy use in Iraq, such as armored patrol vehicles, trucks, radios and unmanned surveillance planes, according to Army documents.

In June, for example, the Army set aside about $50 million to buy more long-range radios, which are used heavily in Iraq.

One month later, Army officials, who were short about $1.5 billion to make end-of-year payroll, took the money back. Army brigades are supposed to have about 1,300 radios. Today, the average brigade makes do with about 1,100.

The shortages have been especially hard on the National Guard, which in some states has only about 40% of the authorized equipment for homeland defense missions, says Gen. Speakes.
Active-duty troops preparing to go off to war at bases such as Fort Stewart, Ga., feel the crunch as well. First Sgt. Bradley Feltman, who will leave in January for his second year-long tour in three years, says his troop was short of Humvees to train on and had only 25% of the mounts it needed for its machine guns.

The lack of equipment hindered the unit's ability to train as an entire 130-man unit. Instead, they trained one 30-soldier platoon at a time.

"We got training, but not graduate-level training. In a couple of months, my guys are going to be busting down doors, and it will be the first time they see some of their equipment for real," he says.

At Fort Hood, the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, which returned from Iraq in March and will go back in fall 2007, is already worried about time to prepare. The regiment will spend most of the winter receiving new soldiers, fielding new equipment and learning to use it. The regiment left most of its tanks and Humvees in Iraq for follow-on units.

That means troops won't have much time to train for other critical tasks. Junior leaders need to know everything from how to assess a water plant to the tribal politics of the area where they are deploying, says Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, the unit's deputy commander. They must know enough Arabic to interact with locals.

"It is incredibly frustrating for combat veterans to return to Iraq for the third time with only minimal training on the skills we know are essential, like language, culture, intelligence and local security force development" Col. Yingling says.

"Army units don't fail to train on these tasks because we're stupid or lazy; we fail because we don't have the time to do it right."

Today's younger officers, whose defining experiences have been in Iraq and Afghanistan, see the world differently.

The gulf was clear last month in their reaction to the dismissal of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

Many senior officers quietly celebrated his departure. Like the retired generals who earlier this year called for Mr. Rumsfeld to be fired, they placed the blame for the Army's failures in Iraq largely on his shoulders.

Junior officers were more indifferent. They tended to view Mr. Rumsfeld as "part of a larger problem that hasn't been solved yet," says Kalev Sepp, a former Special Forces officer who worked extensively in Iraq.

Among many of these officers, there is great frustration not just with the defense secretary but also with the generals who serve above them.

"Junior officers know that success in these wars is about a lot more than killing the enemy. It depends on providing security for the people, finding friends and fixing infrastructure," says Maj. John Prior, who served as a company commander in Baghdad.

"A lot of senior officers just don't get it."
While the Army's new draft counterinsurgency doctrine sounds these same themes, senior commanders in Iraq have been slow to embrace them.

The doctrine says troops must live among the Iraqi people, on small bases run by junior leaders. But since 2004, commanders have consolidated U.S. troops on 55 large fortified bases, down from about 110 a year ago.

The new doctrine says that when battling an insurgency, reconstruction dollars are as important as ammunition. In recent months, though, more restrictions have been placed on how junior leaders can spend money in their sectors.

Some question how quickly the Army will be able to shift its thinking. "All our organizations are designed around the least important line of operations in these fights -- combat operations," says Col. Yingling.

"If you spend your whole career in tanks, you tend to see the solution to every problem as a tank."

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**THIS IS HOW BUSH BRINGS THE TROOPS HOME:**

**BRING THEM ALL HOME NOW, ALIVE**

The casket of Staff Sgt. Henry W. Linck of Manhattan, Kan. at Arlington National Cemetery Dec. 18, 2006. Linck, a paratrooper, was killed by a roadside bomb in Iraq. (AP Photo/Haraz N. Ghanbari)

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**IRAQ RESISTANCE ROUNDPUP**
Guerrillas killed two policemen when they attacked a checkpoint near a cemetery in Baquba late on Friday, police said.

An Iraqi army officer was killed and three soldiers wounded when a roadside bomb exploded in the Rashad district, 40 km south of Kirkuk 250 (155 miles) north of Baghdad.

A bomb planted in a car carrying Electricity Ministry officials killed the driver and wounded two in eastern Baghdad, an Interior Ministry source said.

A roadside bomb targeting a police patrol wounded three policemen near the Technology University in central Baghdad, an Interior Ministry source said.

Insurgents captured police Captain Nihad Khalid, head of emergency police in Samarra, 100 km (60 miles) north of Baghdad, after storming his house, police said. A curfew was imposed afterwards in the city.

Guerrillas killed Khaireddine al-Dabagh, a member of the city council in Mosul and killed a policeman on his way to work in Kirkuk.

A roadside bomb attack on a police patrol wounded two policemen on the main road between Tuz Khurmatu and Kirkuk, 250 km (155 miles) north of Baghdad, police said.

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**IF YOU DON’T LIKE THE RESISTANCE END THE OCCUPATION**

**FORWARD OBSERVATIONS**

“It Was The Rebellion Of Lowranking GIs That Forced The Government To Abandon A Hopeless And Suicidal Policy”
“Most Fraggings Were Aimed At Eliminating The Abusive Practices Of Individual Commanders”

[SOLDIERS IN REVOLT: THE QUASI-MUTINY]

The majority of grunts in Vietnam had but one aim, to return home safely, and few were willing to risk their lives for a hopeless cause. As violent and ruthless as it may have been, fragging was an essential tool of soldier democracy, the means by which men thrust into Vietnam against their wills were able to resist military authority.

It was the final manifestation of a breakdown in the U.S. mission in Vietnam and signaled an Army at war with itself.

On April 20, 1971, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield began the proceedings of Congress by dramatically introducing his colleagues and the nation to the most macabre development of the Vietnam War: fragging.
In a trembling voice, Mansfield grimly told of a young first lieutenant, a West Point graduate from Montana, who was murdered by his own men at Bien Hoa on March 15, just four weeks before his scheduled return to the States.

In the brief comments following Mansfield’s disclosure, Senator Charles Mathias of Maryland captured the shock and dismay of those present:

“In every war a new vocabulary springs up . . . but in all the lexicon of war there is not a more tragic word than ‘fragging’ with all that it implies of total failure of discipline and depression of morale, the complete sense of frustration and confusion and the loss of goals and hope itself.”

The Army began keeping records on assaults with explosive devices in 1969. Through the end of 1970, over three hundred incidents had taken place, resulting in seventy-three deaths and injury to nearly five hundred people.

By July of 1972, as the last American troops were leaving Vietnam, the total number of incidents had reached 551, with eighty-six soldiers dead and over seven hundred injured.

In effect, these are the casualty figures for the Army’s “other war” in Vietnam, its battle with the insurgents in its own ranks.

As startling as these totals may be, fraggings were in fact more frequent than the Pentagon’s figures imply.

One quite obvious deficiency is that the statistics include only assaults with explosive devices and omit the vast number of shootings with firearms, which, given greater availability, probably occurred more often.

David Addlestone reports that Army lawyers with the 173rd Airborne told of periods during 1970 and 1971 when violent attacks were almost a daily occurrence.

In fact, assaults against commanders during the Vietnam War probably reached into the thousands.

The Pentagon figures do indicate a sharp rise in the rate of fragging, with the number of incidents increasing each year from 1969 to 1971, despite troop withdrawals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>Number of Assaults</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 (first 11 months only)</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Military spokesmen sometimes claim that many of these incidents involved attacks among low-ranking enlisted men, particularly blacks against whites, but the Pentagon’s own figures show that the great majority of fraggings were aimed at those in positions of authority.
Statistics supplied to the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee for the period January 1969 to August 1971 show that, of 43 identified fragging victims, approximately 80 per cent were officers and NCOs.

Fragging was the GI’s ultimate means of resistance, a deadly and effective weapon against military authority and dangerous or oppressive policies.

A few examples will show the powerful impact of fragging.

In 1970, former Marine Sergeant Robert Parkinson of Sunland, California, appeared before a Congressional Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency. A crippled man, the sergeant told how two years earlier, in Vietnam, he had attempted to crack down on widespread drug use within his unit; how he began to receive threats and eventually had to arm himself; and how on September 23, 1968, a fragmentation grenade exploded under his bunk, shattering his foot and causing severe internal injuries.

The sergeant’s tragic experience was not unique, even at this early stage of the war.

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Herbert told interviewers for Playboy magazine of similar attacks within his battalion of the 173rd Airborne before he took command in early 1969:

“There had been two attempts on the previous commander’s life. There had been quite a few fraggings in that battalion, of both officers and senior enlisted men.

“One man had both legs blown off; seven people had been wounded by a grenade, and a Claymore mine had been thrown right at the tactical-operations center—a mine to kill the staff, for Christ’s sake.”

Most fraggings were aimed at eliminating the abusive practices of individual commanders.

On November 9, 1970, an incendiary grenade was thrown into the quarters of several notoriously rigid NCOs of the 2nd Battalion/17th Artillery at Nha Trang. The sergeants escaped unhurt, but presumably they got the message from the grunts to ease up.

A similar incident occurred several months later within the 538th Transportation Company at Long Binh. The unit seethed with discontent over the policies of the first sergeant, and talk of fagging was blatant. In April of 1971 the sergeant finally fell victim to an attack, later blamed on Sp/4’s Richard Buckingham, a member of VVAW [Vietnam Veterans Against The War], and Richard Strain.

Fraggings also took place under combat conditions.

In his January 1972 article in Saturday Review, Eugene Linden recounted an episode in an armored cavalry unit near Khe San in the spring of 1971.

After four months in the bush, the company was scheduled to return to Khe San, when the commander, at the last minute, volunteered his men to stay out on patrol. That
night, three Claymore mines were stolen and placed under what was thought to be the commander’s armored track vehicle.

The captain was elsewhere, though, and the explosion injured (apparently accidentally) four enlisted men sleeping nearby.

Linden also reported on a fragging involving black radicals at Camp Eagle during the Laotian invasion in March of 1971. The commander of a supply unit at the camp had attempted to discipline several militants for drug use, but after jailing one of the blacks, the captain was wounded in his sleep by a Claymore mine slipped under his bunk.

Similarly, In a 1972 article for Life magazine, John Saar wrote of a fragging in the fall of 1971 in which grunts attempted to blow up their overly zealous commander but accidentally killed the wrong officer. In an unannounced urinalysis test immediately after the slaying, 25 per cent of the men were detected as heroin users and removed from the unit.

The ultimate impact of fragging lay not with any one particular incident but with its general effect on the functioning of the Army.

For every one of the more than five hundred reported assaults, there were many instances of intimidation and threats of fragging which often produced the same result.

The unexpected appearance of a grenade pin or the detonation of a harmless smoke grenade frequently convinced commanders to abandon expected military standards. Once a commander was threatened by or became the actual target of a fragging, his effectiveness and that of the unit involved were severely hampered.

Indeed, as internal defiance spread within many units, no order could be issued without first considering the possibility of fragging.

The ardent young West Point graduate, eager to succeed in combat and push his men to medal-winning heroics, was a doomed figure.

The majority of grunts in Vietnam had but one aim, to return home safely, and few were willing to risk their lives for a hopeless cause. As violent and ruthless as it may have been, fragging was an essential tool of soldier democracy, the means by which men thrust into Vietnam against their wills were able to resist military authority.

It was the final manifestation of a breakdown in the U.S. mission in Vietnam and signaled an Army at war with itself.

The plague of disaffection and defiance within the ranks, most dramatically evidenced in fragging, crippled the infantry and left the once-proud American Army helpless, more a liability than an asset to U.S. purposes.
This was perhaps best illustrated by the Army’s attempted solution to the problem of fragging.

By 1970, many commanders in Vietnam apparently felt that enlisted men could no longer be trusted with weapons and began a policy of restricting access to explosive devices and rifles.

Information from various separate sources and conversations with Vietnam veterans confirm that in many units grenades and firearms were taken from all but those on guard duty and on combat patrol.

Sp/5 William Fischer, then of the 440th Signal Battalion in Mannheim, related in June 1970 (at an anti-war gathering in London’s Lyceum Ballroom) how several months earlier in Vietnam a colonel refused to arm the men in his camp, despite an NLF attack, because he was “afraid of incidents.”

Similarly, in 1971, members of “Better Blacks United,” an anti-racist organization centered in Tuy Hoa, disclosed that commanders restricted the possession of arms among blacks and white radicals.

Correspondents for Time, the Washington Post, and other journals likewise observed instances of troops being denied access to weapons. Thus soldiers were stripped of the very weapons with which they had been sent to fight.

Limiting possession of weapons may have prevented some fraggings, but it also undermined the U.S. role in Vietnam.

An Army so utterly demoralized clearly was incapable of functioning as a credible military force.

Military officials and some journalists have asserted that the Army did not seriously fall apart until after extensive withdrawals began; that troops grew restless because they were taken out of combat and thus became bored.

Such arguments raise a “chicken and egg” dilemma: did resistance force the Pentagon to withdraw, or did withdrawal create dissent and unrest?

The actual process was no doubt a dialectic combination of the two, each process playing on the other to produce constantly deteriorating troop morale and an ever-increasing rate of withdrawal.

Nonetheless, too little attention has been directed to the question of just what influence the Army’s collapse in Vietnam had on Nixon-administration disengagement policies.

It’s hard to pinpoint a date when turbulence within the infantry reached a critical state, but my own guess would be that by early 1970 morale problems were already beginning to create grave difficulties.

Several combat refusals had already been reported, drug-use levels were approaching 50 per cent, and fraggings were spreading rapidly; black and white
troops throughout the services were loudly clamoring for an end to the war and greater personal freedoms.

David Hackworth’s description of the 173rd Brigade at An Khe, even as early as 1969, suggests an Army rapidly approaching collapse:

“Pound for pound, the Brigade was garbage. Discipline was lax; the troops were slovenly, mentally as well as physically. It was obvious that in An Khe at least they were no match for either the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese regulars. As the sergeant had said, they preferred pot, two to one. But marijuana was only an expression of a deeper, more serious failure. . . .

“They called the hierarchy ‘motherfuckers’ and printed ‘fuck the Green Machine’ on their jackets and hats.”

There seems little doubt that troop withdrawals were in fact speeded up because of the GI revolt.

Military officials were compelled to act in order to preserve the Army as an institution and prevent even further internal disintegration.

This was done not only because of fragging and mutiny in Vietnam itself but because of the generalized crisis throughout the armed forces at the time: the plummeting reenlistment rates, soaring desertions, and rising dissent which threatened to destroy the American military apparatus.

Against such a background, it’s not surprising that voices were raised to submit to the pressures for withdrawal. Stewart Alsop, a veteran journalist with reputed close connections to Pentagon officials, penned an extraordinary Newsweek editorial, in December 1970, reporting a “growing feeling among the Administration’s policymakers that it might be a good idea to accelerate the rate of withdrawal.”

The main reason cited for this view, according to Alsop, was “that discipline and morale in the American Army in Vietnam are deteriorating very seriously.”

Similar sentiments were attributed to Pentagon officials a few weeks later in a Time magazine article on GI dissent: “Officers from Chief of Staff William C. Westmoreland on clown are known to be arguing that they are not being pulled out fast enough.”

Washington Post reporters also found appeals for accelerated withdrawal rates among many leading officers who “believe that a continued presence provides little help for the Vietnamese but exacerbates the problems of drags and disaffection.”

There were also reports in early 1971 that then Secretary of Defense Laird returned from an inspection tour of Vietnam “shocked and distressed by the high level of marijuana use and the low level of morale” and urged a more rapid reduction in ground troops.

The Nixon administration claimed and received great credit for withdrawing the Army from Vietnam, but in fact it was the rebellion of lowranking GIs that forced the government to abandon a hopeless and suicidal policy.
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OCCUPATION REPORT

Good News For The Iraqi Resistance!!

U.S. Occupation Commands’ Stupid Terror Tactics Recruit Even More Fighters To Kill U.S. Troops
Iraqi citizens try to pick up the pieces of their belongings in a house raided by U.S. forces in Baghdad's Sadr City December 16, 2006. (IRAQ)

12.16.06 Reuters: Karim Mohammed Saeed, brother of arrested man, saying (in Arabic):

"All of a sudden we heard bangs on the door and strong kicks. Then they stormed into the house, ordering us to stand. We did not know why. They handcuffed us and made us stand facing the wall. They searched the house, scattering furniture."

*************************************************************************

[Fair is fair. Let’s bring 150,000 Iraqi troops over here to the USA. They can kill people at checkpoints, bust into their houses with force and violence, butcher their families, overthrow the government, put a new one in office they like better and call it “sovereign,” and “detain” anybody who doesn’t like it in some prison without any charges being filed against them, or any trial.]

[Those Iraqis are sure a bunch of backward primitives. They actually resent this help, have the absurd notion that it’s bad their country is occupied by a foreign military dictatorship, and consider it their patriotic duty to fight and kill the soldiers sent to grab their country. What a bunch of silly people. How fortunate they are to live under a military dictatorship run by George Bush. Why, how could anybody not love that? You’d want that in your home town, right?]

“In the States, if police burst into your house, kicking down doors and swearing at you, you would call your lawyer and file a lawsuit,” said Wood, 42, from Iowa, who did not accompany Halladay’s Charlie Company, from his battalion, on Thursday’s raid. “Here, there are no lawyers. Their resources are limited, so they plant IEDs (improvised explosive devices) instead.”

DANGER: POLITICIANS AT WORK
CLASS WAR REPORTS

On the US-Mexican Border

[Thanks to David Honish, Veterans, who sent this in.]
NEED SOME TRUTH? CHECK OUT TRAVELING SOLDIER

Telling the truth - about the occupation or the criminals running the government in Washington - is the first reason for Traveling Soldier. But we want to do more than tell the truth; we want to report on the resistance - whether it's in the streets of Baghdad, New York, or inside the armed forces. Our goal is for Traveling Soldier to become the thread that ties working-class people inside the armed services together. We want this newsletter to be a weapon to help you organize resistance within the armed forces. If you like what you've read, we hope that you'll join with us in building a network of active duty organizers.

http://www.traveling-soldier.org/ And join with Iraq War vets in the call to end the occupation and bring our troops home now! (www.ivaw.net)

What do you think? Comments from service men and women, and veterans, are especially welcome. Write to The Military Project, Box 126, 2576 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-5657 or send to contact@militaryproject.org:. Name, I.D., withheld on request. Replies confidential. Same to unsubscribe.

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