f) Brian Spratt gave a brief summary of the conclusions of the Royal Society
report. The main conclusion was that, for the majority of soldiers on the
battlefield it is unlikely there will have been any adverse effects on the
kidneys from DU exposure. In extreme circumstances there could be an
above normal risk of kidney damage if large amounts of uranium were
inhaled or ingested. However, the Royal Society (and the MOD) were
unaware of any British soldiers to whom this would apply. Brian Spratt
stressed that the work of the OB in establishing a retrospective test was
important as there was uncertainty about the exposures that people had
received. It was considered that there was little information on the long-term
effects of uranium on the kidney. Chris Busby noted his concerns about this,
citing the example of a Granada TV cameraman who had experienced major
kidney problems since filming in Iraq. He was also worried by cancer
statistics for Italian peacekeepers in the Balkans and for Iraqi civilians. Ray
Bristow stated that the Royal Society had declined to consider information on
possible health effects from Iraq in the preparation for their report. Brian
Spratt countered that the RS was aware that people in Iraq have associated ill-
health with exposure to DU but had not so far seen any properly validated
data to support these claims. [The issue of cancer in Italian peacekeepers is
discussed in Section 8 of these minutes]
g) Ivor Connolly asked if OB members were aware of the MOD response to
the RS report and the MOD proposals for research into DU that had recently
been released. Brigid Rodgers stated that the MOD research proposals had
just been released to veterans’ organisations for their comments. The
Chairman asked for this document to be circulated to the Board
Action 4.4 Secretary to circulate the MOD research proposals
h) There was some discussion about whether the protocol detailing the
preparation of the spiked samples for the pilot exercise should be released to
all Board members. David Lewis pointed out that the protocol contains the
exact figures for the concentrations and isotope ratios in the samples and that
the more people with access to this information the greater the risk of it
becoming available outside the DUOB, thus prejudicing the results of the
pilot exercise. It was generally agreed that the protocol should be circulated to
board members with the spiking information removed (with the exception of
David Coggon, David Lewis, Peter van Calsteren and Malcolm Hooper who
had contributed to the creation of the protocol). Chris Busby stated that he
would like to be included on the list of those receiving the whole protocol –
this was agreed.
Action 4.5. Secretary to edit and distribute protocol document
i) Ray Bristow expressed concern that the chosen test for the main testing
programme would not be of sufficient sensitivity to detect DU 11 years after
the exposure. Malcolm Hooper stated that he had discussed the subject with a
number of contacts and the consensus view was that a suitable test should be
possible. [Malcolm Hooper had been involved in the design of the spiking
regime and had attended a meeting with the NEQAS lab along with David
Lewis and Peter van Calsteren. At that meeting, Malcolm Hooper had fully
endorsed the concentrations and isotope ratios that were chosen as reflecting
the needs of the Gulf Veterans].
j) David Lewis stated that he had so far been unable to produce the
promised paper on evaluating laboratories but would update his previous draft
on this subject prior to the next meeting. [This is covered by action 3.7.]
Secretary
(16/4/02)
Secretary
(17/5/02)