November 5, 2007: This website is an archive of the former website, traprockpeace.org, which was created 10 years ago by Charles Jenks. It became one of the most populace sites in the US, and an important resource on the antiwar movement, student activism, 'depleted' uranium and other topics. Jenks authored virtually all of its web pages and multimedia content (photographs, audio, video, and pdf files. As the author and registered owner of that site, his purpose here is to preserve an important slice of the history of the grassroots peace movement in the US over the past decade. He is maintaining this historical archive as a service to the greater peace movement, and to the many friends of Traprock Peace Center. Blogs have been consolidated and the calendar has been archived for security reasons; all other links remain the same, and virtually all blog content remains intact.THIS SITE NO LONGER REFLECTS THE CURRENT AND ONGOING WORK OF TRAPROCK PEACE CENTER, which has reorganized its board and moved to Greenfield, Mass. To contact Traprock Peace Center, call 413-773-7427 or visit its site. Charles Jenks is posting new material to PeaceJournal.org, a multimedia blog and resource center.
Other papers by Dr. Rangwala:
On Feburary 14, Hans Blix (UNMOVIC) and Mohamed ElBaradei (IAEA) presented reported to the UN. Dr. Rangwala reviews the evidence they presented to the Security Council on 14 February 2003, and contrasts it to the claims of Colin Powell to the Security Council on 5 February and Tony Blair in a dossier of 2 February. See also Dr. Rangwala's analysis of the Colin Powell presentation to the UN on Feb 5.
Dr. Rangwala has incorporated parts of this analysis of Colin Powell's presentation into 'Counter-Dossier II', his comprehensive analysis of claims concerning Iraq's proscribed weapons capabilities.
Dr. Rangwala spotted the fact that the Blair government had plagairized its Dossier concering Iraq's intelligence infrastructure.
See British Dossier Scandal.
Go to Media Coverage and Links
Go to Normon Solomon Commentary
by Glen Rangwala, Lecturer in Politics at Cambridge University - email@example.com
Gen. Hussein Kamel, the former director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, in charge of Iraq's weapons programme, defected to Jordan on the night of 7 August 1995, together with his brother Col. Saddam Kamel. Hussein Kamel took crates of documents revealing past weapons programmes, and provided these to UNSCOM. Iraq responded by revealing a major store of documents that showed that Iraq had begun an unsuccessful crash programme to develop a nuclear bomb (on 20 August 1995). Hussein and Saddam Kamel agreed to return to Iraq, where they were assassinated (23 February 1996).
The interview was conducted in Amman on 22 August 1995, 15 days after Kamel left Iraq. His interviewers were:
During the interview, Major Izz al-Din al-Majid (transliterated as Major Ezzeddin) joins the discussion (p.10). Izz al-Din is Saddam Hussein's cousin, and defected together with the Kamel brothers. He did not return with them to Iraq in 1996, moving instead to Jordan and now to an unknown European country.
In the transcript of the interview, Kamel states categorically:
"I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons - biological,
chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed"
Kamel specifically discussed the significance of anthrax, which he portrayed as the "main focus" of the biological programme (pp.7-8). Smidovich asked Kamel: "were weapons and agents destroyed?"
Kamel replied: "nothing remained".
He confirmed that destruction took place "after visits of inspection teams. You have important role in Iraq with this. You should not underestimate yourself. You are very effective in Iraq." (p.7)
Kamel added: "I made the decision to disclose everything so that Iraq could return to normal." (p.8)
Furthermore, Kamel describes the elimination of prohibited missiles: "not a single missile left but they had blueprints and molds for production. All missiles were destroyed." (p.8)
On VX, Kamel claimed: "they put it in bombs during last days of the Iran-Iraq war. They were not used and the programme was terminated." (p.12).
Ekeus asked Kamel: "did you restart VX production after the Iran-Iraq war?"
Kamel replied: "we changed the factory into pesticide production. Part of the establishment started to produce medicine [...] We gave insturctions [sic] not to produce chemical weapons." (p.13).
Despite the significance of these claims, it was not known that Kamel made this assertion until February 2003. Kamel's claim was first carried on 24 February 2003 by Newsweek, who reported that Kamel told U.N. inspectors that Iraq had destroyed its entire stockpile of chemical and biological weapons and banned missiles, as Iraq claims (Newsweek, 3/3/03). Newsweek reported that the weapons were destroyed secretly, in order to hide their existence from inspectors, in the hopes of someday resuming production after inspections had finished. The CIA and MI6 were told the same story, Newsweek reported.
However, these facts were "hushed up by the U.N. inspectors" in order to "bluff Saddam into disclosing still more", according to Newsweek.
CIA spokesman Bill Harlow angrily denied the Newsweek report. "It is incorrect, bogus, wrong, untrue," Harlow told Reuters the day the report appeared (Reuters, 24 February 2003).
On Wednesday (26 February 2003), a complete copy of the Kamel transcript -- an internal UNSCOM/IAEA document stamped "sensitive" -- was obtained by Glen Rangwala.
Kamel's departure from Iraq was the major turning point of the inspections saga. As UNSCOM said in their final substantive report:
" the overall period of the Commission's disarmament work must be divided into two parts, separated by the events following the departure from Iraq, in August 1995, of Lt. General Hussein Kamal".
(25 January 1999 letter to U.N. Security Council, Enclosure 1, para.12).
Kamel's defection has been cited repeatedly by President Bush and leading officials in both the UK and US as evidence that (1) Iraq has not disarmed; (2) inspections cannot disarm it; and (3) defectors such as Kamel are the most reliable source of information on Iraq's weapons.
Hussein Kamel was not in the process of providing excuses for the Iraqi regime. Much of the interview is taken up with his criticisms of its mistakes: "They are only interested in themselves and not worried about economics or political state of the country. [..] I can state publicly I will work against the regime." (p.14). And yet, when it comes to prohibited weapons, Kamel is unequivocal: Iraq destroyed these weapons soon after the Gulf War.
The above quotes from President Bush, Prime Minister Blair and Secretary Powell refer to material produced by Iraq before the 1991 Gulf War. The administration has cited various quantities of chemical and biological weapons on many other occasions -- weapons that Iraq produced but which remain unaccounted for. All of these claims refer to weapons produced before 1991. According to Kamel's transcript, Iraq destroyed all of these weapons in 1991.
Kamel's statement casts into new light the claims made by the Iraqi government
that it destroyed its non-conventional weapons in the period immediately after
the end of the Gulf War. This topic remains highly potent, with Hans Blix declaring
that "[o]ne of three important questions before us today is how much might
remain undeclared and intact from before 1991" (statement
of 27 January 2003 to the Security Council). If Kamel is to be taken as
seriously as the UK and US administrations have previously held him to be, then
his claim that "[a]ll weapons - biological, chemical, missile, nuclear
were destroyed" should be taken seriously.
This briefing was produced by Glen Rangwala. Thanks to Seth Ackerman of FAIR for his assistance in putting it together.