Colin Powell at UN - Talking Points by Phyllis Bennis

3 February 2003

Phyllis Bennis -- Institute for Policy Studies and United for Peace and Justice

Colin Powell's presentation at the UN Security Council on Wednesday is
likely to be strong on quantity and weak on quality - with little or no new
information, and little or no actual proof of the presence of WMDs in Iraq,
or links between the Iraqi government and al Qaeda. There will be lots of
photographs, charts, and barely-audible sound-bites ostensibly
demonstrating links between Iraq and al Qaeda or other terrorists.
Powell will likely try to apply the Pentagon's new favorite battlefield
strategy of "shock and awe" to the Security Council, overwhelming the
foreign ministers and ambassadors present (as well as the global television
audience) with massive amounts of material.

To answer Powell's presentation, challenges will likely need to focus on:

1) Photographs of people cleaning a "suspect site" do not equal proof of
hidden weapons

2) Satellite photos of trucks with equipment on the back do not equal proof
of "mobile WMD production facilities"

3) Snippets of intercepted telephone conversations of such remarks as "can
you believe they missed that one?" or the equivalent do not prove links
with al Qaeda or proof that Iraqis are trying to hide WMDs from inspectors

4) U.S. officials admit some of their "evidence" comes from interrogation
of detainees held incommunicado at Guantanamo Bay. The Washington Post
(Dec. 26) quoted Bush administration officials suggesting detainees held in
U.S. custody in Afghanistan, some of whom may now be in Guantanamo, have
been tortured or threatened with being sent to countries which routinely
practice torture. Any information resulting from torture (or threat of
torture) is not only illegally obtained but of questionable veracity.
Other challenges to the U.S. position:

1) Hans Blix himself has denied recent Bush administration claims of Iraqi
violations, some of which officials claimed were based on the inspectors'
reports. He denied Powell's claim that Iraqi officials were hiding and
moving WMD material inside and outside Iraq, saying inspectors had not
found any such incidents. He said he had not seen convincing evidence Iraq
was sending scientists out of Iraq. He denied Bush's State of the Union
claim that Iraqi agents were posing as scientists or that UNMOVIC had been
penetrated by Iraqi agents. Crucially, he said he had "seen no persuasive
indications of Iraqi ties to al-Qaeda." (New York Times, 1 Feb. 2003)

2) Both the CIA and FBI have questioned the veracity of Bush administration
claims that intelligence backs up their claims of Iraq-al Qaeda links, or
of clear WMD presence in Iraq.

"Some analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency have complained that
senior administration officials have exaggerated the significance of some
intelligence reports about Iraq, particularly about its possible links to
terrorism, in order to strengthen their political argument for war,
government officials said. At the Federal Bureau of Investigation, some
investigators said they were baffled by the Bush administration's
insistence on a solid link between Iraq and Osama bin Laden's network.

'We've been looking at this hard for more than a year and you know what, we
just don't think it's there,' a government official said. …

"Mr. Bush asserted in his State of the Union address this week that Iraq
was protecting and aiding Qaeda operatives, but American intelligence and
law enforcement officials said the evidence was fragmentary and
inconclusive."

--New York Times, 2 February 2003

3) MOST IMPORTANT: EVEN ACTUAL EVIDENCE OF IRAQI VIOLATION(S) OF UN
RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING 1441 OR THE ORIGINAL DISARMAMENT/SANCTIONS
RESOLUTION 687, DO NOT REPRESENT A BASIS FOR WAR.

The U.S. and Britain have agreed to a "good cop/bad cop" formula, with
Britain taking the lead urging a second Security Council meeting as
provided for in resolution 1441, and some version of a second resolution
aimed at gaining UN support for war on Iraq.

The timeline will likely look something like this:

FEBRUARY 5 -- Powell presentation to Council, prepared responses from
Council members.

FEBRUARY 14 - Blix & el Baradei present next interim reports on inspectors'
findings.

At that meeting or soon after, Council will accept British proposal for
setting an ultimatum for Iraqi compliance, without specifying what the
consequences would be for non-compliance. Deadline will likely be 30 days.
This vote might be close to unanimous; the language will not explicitly
authorize a military response.

FEBRUARY 28 - Next UNMOVIC & IAEA interim reports; will likely still be
equivocal. Council may determine at that meeting Iraq still not in full
compliance. They will likely call on Baghdad to comply with the demands of
the ultimatum.

MID - MARCH - Last UNMOVIC & IAEA interim reports issued. If reports do
not confirm full Iraqi compliance, the U.S. & Britain will claim a free
hand to attack Iraq under authority of the February 14 ultimatum
resolution, claiming there is no need for any further authorization.
France, Germany, Russia, China (and several other Council members) will
state that the Feb. 14 resolution does NOT authorize a military strike.
They will then stand aside, allow the U.S. and Britain to attack Iraq,
while telling their respective outraged publics that they do not endorse
military action. They will make no move to challenge the U.S.-British war
in the Council. Inspectors will be pulled out of Iraq "for their own
safety." (The question will be raised whether this time the UN's
humanitarian staff will be withdrawn as well, or left under the bombs as
they were during Desert Fox in December 1998.)

Page created February 4, 2003 by Charlie Jenks.